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How many philosophers does it take to change a light bulb?
“It depends what you mean by ‘change’...”
The absence of  philosophy in education policy rests in popular discourses 
that misconceive of  it as an ‘armchair’ activity, remotely connected to everyday life, 
and not focused on concrete action. As this article’s opening suggests, philosophy bears 
the brunt of  many a joke for allegedly spending too much time in contemplation of  the 
obscure, without getting around to accomplishing the practical.
Policy, by contrast, is viewed as productive, and focused on solving problems 
(though not always to the satisfaction of  all citizens). It is construed as linear and 
dealing exclusively with factual and technical matters. According to these stereotypical 
views (as common in the academy as they are among the public), philosophy never gets 
things done; policy always gets things done. As such, philosophy and policy appear to 
be incompatible. This essay explores how a reconstitution of  these terms in a more 
accurate manner might revive their relationship. We will demonstrate how ‘common 
sense,’ anemic beliefs about philosophy and policy hinder the ability to view them in 
more productive ways. 
Although philosophy may have garnered the impression that it is not 
concerned with practical matters, its very roots in the western tradition reflect a central 
concern with the practice of  dialogue and discussion as a way to bring about productive 
change. The root of  the English word ‘policy’ is the Greek word ‘polis,’ meaning the 
city in which philosophical and political discussions took place among full-fledged 
citizens responsible for determining how the state would be run. By abandoning its 
semantic roots, policy limits itself  to narrow disciplinary methodologies, rather than 
broad philosophical inquiry.1
In addition to being historically intricately related, philosophy and policy 
are at times synonymous. These similarities are a basis for reconfiguring philosophy’s 
place in policy.  Indeed, philosophy is policy if  we rely on philosophical texts to make 
suggestions about what the good life is and how to live the good life, reconcile tensions, 
and resolve dilemmas and come to compromise over disputes.  Our concern here is 
education policy: the directions from governments as to the content and nature of  
1 Carl Mitcham and Richard Frodeman, “New Dimensions in the Philosophy of  
Science: Toward a Philosophy of  Science Policy,” Philosophy Today 48 No. 5 
(2004): 3-14.  
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education systems. Philosophy and education share a common goal: the development 
of  individual and collective capacities, keeping in mind the nature of  the good and 
virtuous life. Education policy offers both general and specific direction to achieve this 
goal. 
Education policy (unlike philosophy) frequently makes the news. Unending 
cycles of  reform lead to disputes over the relevance and quality of  education. Ensuing 
headlines mourn the decline of  education systems, while parents have taken to 
boycotting shortsighted standardized testing regimes.2 At the centre of  controversies 
about what should be taught, who should measure educational success and by what 
means, and how schools should be run is education policy.3 In the past 20 years, nations 
have taken to issuing more and more education policy, and that policy is increasingly 
detailed and prescriptive.4 Since the election of  Ontario’s Liberal government in 2003, 
the Ministry of  Education has released unprecedented compulsory education policies 
on issues never before addressed: character education, financial literacy, mental health, 
daily physical activity, environmental action, to name but a few. Beyond its sheer 
quantity,5 such education policy is arguably distorted and incomplete, rife with slogans 
and rhetoric. We have all heard about ‘evidence based teaching and policy,’ ‘back 
to basics’ curriculum and ‘character education,’ without clarity about what justifies 
‘evidence,’ ‘basics’  and ‘character.’6 
A preoccupation with standardization, test scores, quantitative indicators 
and narrow (often punitive) accountability measures de-humanizes learners. The high 
degree regulation makes students “objects” of  education policy (education is “done 
to” objects), rather than subjects in several ways. First, highly prescriptive curriculum 
leaves little room for local curriculum development and attention to the needs of  
diverse communities. When this type of  curriculum is “done to” them, little room is left 
for the kind of  individually and culturally responsive content and pedagogy relevant to 
students and can take on issues of  colonialism, racism, and power.7 
2 See, for example, Dennis Fox, “Radical Dilemmas in the Anti-High-Stakes-Testing 
Movement,” The Radical Teacher No. 61 (2001): 28-35
3 Laura E. Pinto and John P. Portelli, “The Dangers of  Liberal/Rationalist Policy 
Discourse and the Role of  the Philosopher in Disrupting it, in My Teaching, My 
Philosophy. Kenneth Wain: A Lifelong Engagement With Education eds. S. Galea, D.P. 
Mercieca and J. Baldacchino (Eds.). (New York: Peter Lang, 2014).
4 Including Ontario’s infamous Common Sense Revolution education reforms, see Laura 
E. Pinto, Curriculum Reform in Ontario: ‘Common Sense’ Processes and Democratic 
Possibilities (Toronto: University of  Toronto Press, 2012)
5 Ibid.
6 For example, see Sue Winton, “The Appeal(s) of  Character Education in 
Threatening Times: Caring and critical democratic responses,” Comparative 
Education 44 No. 3 (2008): 305-316.
7 For specific examples, see Laura E. Pinto, “Race and Fear of  the ‘Other’ in 
Common Sense Revolution Reforms,” Critical Education, 4 No. 2 (2013): 1-26.
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A second vehicle of  dehumanization is the preoccupation with standardized 
testing, which reduces education to an exercise of  ranking and sorting such that 
learning is equated to a single test event. Tests, with other accountability measures, 
create under-nourished student-teacher relationships when educator responsibilities 
shift to governments and not students. 8 Standardized testing externalizes decisions 
about “what counts” as worthwhile knowledge, while other important issues not 
captured by standardized scores are “deemed irrelevant or scientifically irrational”9 – 
thus objectifying and de-humanizing both learner and teacher. 
Ill-conceived safe schools policies founded on ‘zero-tolerance’ rhetoric are a 
third example of  dehumanization. Under such policies, students are removed from 
school settings, with no consideration given to the individual or the circumstances The 
Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) successfully challenged the province’s 
zero-tolerance policy for discrimination, resulting in massive policy change.10
The policies just described (and they only represent few among many 
more) failed to fully consider the implications of  ill-conceived rhetoric behind them. 
Unfortunately, rhetoric has failed to produce meaningful public dialogue that might 
have informed better policy decisions, with the exception of  OHRC’s challenge.
These examples call attention to a pronounced need for philosophical 
intervention in education policy. Yet, philosophy has been notably absent from the 
general study of  policy. Carl Mitcham and Richard Frodeman report less than 20 
publications in their search for “philosophy of  policy,” and those that exist are “issues 
focused” rather than philosophical.11  
8 Pasi Sahlberg, “Rethinking Accountability in a Knowledge Society.” Journal 
of  Educational Change 11 (2010): 45-61 and Laura E. Pinto, “The Erosion of  
Trust in Education: Teacher accountability and professionalism,” In Reasonable 
responses: Essays in honour of  Trudy Govier, ed. Catherine Hundleby (Windsor, ON: 
Windsor Studies in Argumentation, in press)
9 Antonia Darder, “Schooling and the Culture of  Dominion: The Politics of  
Standardized Testing,” in The Pedagogies of  Globalization, ed. Gustavo Fischman 
& Peter McLaren (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 208 and also Gert 
J.J. Biesta, “Why ‘What Works’ Won’t Work: Evidence-based Practice and 
the Democratic Deficit In Educational Research,” Educational Theory 57 No. 1 
(2007), 1-22.
10 Yvette Daniel and Karla Bondy, “Safe Schools and Zero Tolerance: Policy, 
Program and Practice in Ontario,”Canadian Journal of  Educational Administration 
and Policy, 70 (2008): 1-20. 
11 Carl Mitcham and Richard Frodeman, “New Dimensions in the Philosophy of  
Science: Toward a Philosophy of  Science Policy,” Philosophy Today 48 No. 5 
(2004): 3-14. 
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Yet, education policy is philosophy in that it defines educational purpose, the 
range of  options to achieve that purpose, and argues for the application of  a particular 
path to normative outcomes.  By reconceiving policy as philosophy and vice versa, we 
reinstate the radical meanings of  both terms.  
Several benefits emerge upon this reconstruction of  policy/philosophy. First, 
philosophical reflection in and on policy expands and deepens understandings of  
education, thus strengthening citizens’ grasp of  the controversies facing policy makers.12 
Second, a reconstruction of  policy/philosophy helps us understand that 
ultimately “the most demanding questions are not simply scientific, but philosophical.”13 
Questions including ‘what education projects should be funded?,’14 ‘what should be 
measured?’, ‘what ought to be our educational aims in the 21st century?’ are intrinsically 
philosophical, though they are rarely (if  ever) framed as such in education policy.   
In Ontario, political and rhetorical versions of  answers to these questions 
appear in various policies – the most recent of  which is 2014’s Achieving Excellence: A 
Renewed Vision for Education in Ontario. It was preceded by consultations that posed a 
number of  practical questions that sought opinions. However, consultations lacked 
philosophical grounding and therefore failed to engage participants in the consideration 
aims of  education, controversies, or perspectives different from their own.15  The 
resulting policy’s problematic direction included the opinion that “A key area of  
curriculum that participants feel is under-developed is entrepreneurship education.”16 
This led to entrepreneurial education as a prominent (but seriously flawed) feature 
of  the “renewed vision.”17 An alternate approach aligned to philosophical methods 
would engage citizens-as-consultation-participants in richer dialogues with multiple 
12 Adapted views on science policy in Mitcham and Frodeman, “New Dimensions in 
the Philosophy of  Science.”
13 Mitcham and Frodeman, “New Dimensions in the Philosophy of  Science,” p. 9
14 The annual cost of  EQAO is estimated at $59 million (Marita Moll, Passing the 
Test: The False Promises of  Standardized Testing, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for 
Policy Alternatives, 2004, 34) – an expenditure that was not mentioned during 
the contentious 2014 provincial election when austerity and savings was a 
major issue of  public debate. 
15 “The Next Phase in Ontario’s Education Strategy,” Ministry of  Education, 
http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/parents/BuildNextPhase.pdf  (Accessed July 1, 
2014).
16 The Learning Partnership (2013). The Learning Partnership’s CEO Roundtable: 
From Great to Excellent: A Response to Ontario’s Education Consultations. 
Retrieved from www.tlp.ca
17 For elaboration on the fallacies and problems with the entrepreneurial focus, see 
Laura E. Pinto, “When Truthiness Prevails: Entrepreneurial Education for 
Kids,” CCPA Monitor 21 No. 1 (2014), 18-19.
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perspectives in the style of  Porto Alegre, Brazil’s participatory policy process to 
promote meaningful dialogue.18 
Third, a reconstruction of  policy/philosophy would address Israel Scheffler’s 
call for reflexivity in policy, in which policy makers would engage in critical reflection. 
Current methods of  policy production ignore the need to consider broader implications, 
democratization, and attention to issues of  power. 19 This is a result of  a more politicized 
approach to policy – where policy makers are no longer analysts – instead carrying out 
the political will of  elected officials or uncritically following the directives of  OECD or 
UNESCO in local arenas.20 Even more alarming is policy privatization, where policy 
production is outsourced to private interests, further eroding the possibility of  critical 
reflection.21 
What would philosophy as education policy look like?  Mitcham and Frodeman 
suggest applying philosophical inquiry rooted in logic, ethics, politics, epistemology, 
aesthetics, and metaphysics. Returning to the example of  standardized testing, 
different philosophical fields (topoi) would address facets of  this policy issue. Logic and 
argumentation might shed light on issues associated with validity of  standardized tests. 
Questions associated with equity would be addressed through ethics (Who benefits? 
Who is marginalized by tests and how?). Aesthetics would uncover what values are 
conveyed within tests, and by testing.  Metaphysical questions might point to issues 
around test structure and content (Whose perspectives are included/excluded? What 
are the consequences?).  The answers to such questions would lead to richer and more 
complete options – though, undoubtedly as controversial and contested as the diversity 
of  thought among philosophers . 
In the preceding examples, we have demonstrated how reviving the deep 
connection between philosophy and policy means widening and deepening how we 
confront education challenges. By focusing on their similarities in holistic manner, 
their close relationship becomes apparent in ways that lead to rich and productive 
possibilities if  philosophers take up policy analysis, and policy-makers engage 
philosophical practices and inquiry. The resulting radical relationship holds the 
18 For elaboration on Porto Alegre’s educative strategies for citizen policy input, see 
Pinto, Curriculum Reform in Ontario.
19 Israel Scheffler, “On the Education of  Policy Makers,” Harvard Educational Review 
54 No. 2 (1996): 152-164
20 Matthew Clarke, “The (Absent) Politics of  Neo-Liberal Education Policy,” Critical 
Studies in Education 53 No. 3 (2012): 297–310; Stavros Moutsios, “Power, Politics 
and Transnational Policy-Making in Education,” Globalisation, Societies and 
Education 8 No. 1 (2010): 121–14.
21 For examples of  such practice in the UK, see Stephen J. Ball, “Privatizing 
Education, Privatizing Education Policy, Privatizing Educational Research: 
Network Governance and the ‘Competition State”, Journal of  Education Policy, 24 
No. 1 (2009): 83-100. In Canada, see Pinto, Curriculum Reform in Ontario.
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promise of  education policy that is less incomplete, distorted and unconscious as it 
otherwise is and may be. 
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